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The National Guard as a Strategic Hedge
James D. Campbell
Abstract: This article suggests alternatives to proposed organizational reductions and balance between the Active force and the
National Guard. It examines specifics of the cost, use, and effectiveness arguments on both sides of this contentious issue. Finally,
this article serves as a catalyst to renew the broader public discussion regarding the proper roles of the regulars and the militia—the
National Guard—as integral parts of the nation’s defense and security architecture.

A

s the year 2014 approaches, the nation anticipates the close
of what has widely been described as the longest war in
our country’s history. With the assumed ending of that war,
many citizens and political leaders anticipate our regular military will
be required to do what it has historically always done at the end of a
war—shrink. Despite the fact the war in Afghanistan is not the nation’s
longest, and our involvement there will likely not entirely end in 2014, the
broad expectation or even demand that the military’s size and budget be
reduced is both normal and necessary.1
This expectation of significant post-war regular military reductions
reflects long, deep-rooted, and traditional national practice. Indeed,
following most of our country’s earliest wars there was a significant
national movement to eliminate the regular army altogether, and return
to our traditional reliance on the citizen-soldiers of the militia for the
country’s defense. After the Revolutionary War the Continental Army
was, in fact, effectively disbanded, with less than one hundred soldiers
retained to guard stores.2 After the War of 1812, the War with Mexico,
the Civil War, and the War with Spain, the regular army was drastically
reduced, and in spite of continuous fighting on the Western frontier, the
nineteenth-century regular army never exceeded a “peacetime” strength
of approximately 30,000.3 In contrast, the organized militia strength
remained at well over 100,000 during this period.4 The first half of the
twentieth century was little different, with the regular army (including
the nascent Army Air Force) reaching a strength of only 125,000 on the

1     The Seminole Wars lasted on and off between 1819 and 1858; the Sioux Wars between 1854
and 1890; the Apache Wars between 1849 and 1886; and the fighting with the Cheyenne people from
the 1850s until 1878. The US involvement in Vietnam lasted fourteen years, from 1961 when the
first combat advisors were deployed until 1975 when the government of South Vietnam collapsed.
2     In 1784, Congress disbanded the Continental Army in the wake of the Newburgh controversy,
and left only 80 soldiers and a handful of officers to guard remaining military stores. See Allen
Millett, and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense, a Military History of the United States
from 1607 to 2012 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 91.
3     Ibid., 280.
4     Ibid., 264.
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eve of the Second World War in 1936.5 That same year the strength of
the National Guard was roughly 400,000.6
The post-conflict reductions of the Army and the Air Force after
the Second World War, the Korean War, and the War in Vietnam were
not as drastic as after previous wars, due to the ongoing Cold War with
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but there were reductions nonetheless. Finally, in the 1990s following the first Gulf War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the active military once again
was reduced in hopes of a “peace dividend.” Certainly these reductions
were not as great as those of many previous major post-war periods, but
they were significant and perceived by the nation and its leadership as
both normal and necessary. At the same time, the combined strength of
the National Guard, both Army and Air, remained close to its historic
norm, approximately 450,000 soldiers and airmen.
One constant has existed through all these wartime expansions and
post-war contractions of the regular military. That constant has been
the relatively steady size of, and national reliance on, the nation’s militia
(since 1903 the National Guard) as a strategic hedge to allow for rapid
expansion of the country’s military capacity in time of emergency. The
militia (and later the National Guard) has provided the “expansible
Army” function first advocated by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
in the 1820s, and has always been federalized (or has provided state
volunteer units) to augment regulars during emergencies. As a result,
much of American military history is really the history of the activated
militia or National Guard; there were virtually no regular units at
Gettysburg, for example, and the second American division to deploy
to France in 1917 was the 26th “Yankee” Division, composed solely of
National Guard units from the New England states. One of the two
Army divisions in the first wave of assault landings on Omaha Beach
at Normandy in 1944 was the 29th Division, a primarily Virginia and
Maryland National Guard division.7 This expansible strategic hedge has
continued to allow for needed growth in regular forces in times of crisis:
In 2004-05, approximately half of the units deployed in Iraq were from
the National Guard, allowing the regulars to reset and begin the growth
in size which allowed virtually continuous unit combat rotations, including units from the National Guard, ever since. 8
This is our history, our national paradigm for military organization and employment which has served us well for the past 237 years.
These peacetime contractions of the regular military and reliance on a
larger, well-trained, and resourced National Guard have been critical to
the nation’s ability to husband resources, and refocus peacetime budget
priorities toward domestic development and economic expansion. This
5     Gene Gurney, A Pictorial History of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishers, 1966),
372.
6     Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, United States Army, 1975), 409-417.
7      Ibid., 418-419; Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, a Military History of the United
States, 280; Dramatically, the 1940 federalization of the National Guard allowed Congress to more
than double the size of the active Army overnight. Federalizing the Guard allowed 300,000 trained
soldiers to be inducted into active duty, augmenting the approximately 125,000 soldiers of the regular Army.
8     Brigadier General Todd McCaffrey, “Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre-and
Post-Mobilization Training,” (Washington, DC: HQDA G3, 12 March 2013).
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ensured we retained the capacity to deter potential adversaries, respond
to crises, and rapidly augment the active military when needed. The
long-recognized fact throughout our history that the militia, when not
federalized, costs significantly less than the regular military has allowed
for this routine peacetime reprioritization of national resources. A lessoften discussed, but nonetheless critical, function of this organizational
method was recognized by the founders of the nation—a small standing regular force and reliance for the preponderance of our security
on the militia acts as a significant brake on executive power, requiring
Congress either to authorize a federalization of the militia or vote for
an expansion of regular forces to mobilize the nation for engagement in
a major conflict. This model has been accepted with a broad consensus
throughout our history by military and civilian leadership and the mass
of our citizens.
The year 2013–14, however, would appear to be different from the
previous 237 years of the country’s existence. During the past twelvemonth period, both Army and Air Force leadership have argued for, and
even attempted to force through, a reduction in forces that would result
in, at best, a partial reversal of this historically proven and accepted
national paradigm. At worst, these moves by the services might result
in a complete reversal of our accepted military system by drastically
reducing the National Guard to what may be its lowest relative level
of strength and combat capability in our history, all while attempting
to keep the active Army and Air Force at a larger size even than at the
beginning of the current period of conflict.
What is different about this particular period of post-conflict national
retrenchment that would cause our service leaders to change historically
proven and accepted norms and practices? Why is there a need, given the
current National Military Strategy and significant resource constraints,
when our conventional forces are not likely to be widely engaged or
deployed in the near future, to retain large forces in the active military
and cut the vastly less-expensive National Guard to the bone? We must
ask these questions while recognizing that our nation has a newly modernized National Guard which more than ever before in its history has
dramatically proven its military capability and effectiveness, and which
has repeatedly reinforced its critical Constitutional domestic support
role in the past twelve years.
To be sure, there is a compelling need for the United States to have
a capable active Army and Air Force. The global commitments of the
nation, and the uncertainties and fast moving crises we may face, all
dictate that our military needs the capability to commit our standing
forces rapidly, and in some cases, in a matter of days or even hours. The
numbered war plans of the Combatant Commands all have validated
requirements for forces which can be deployed swiftly or forwardstationed to execute national strategy. We always have and will continue
to need a strong, ready, and capable regular Army and Air Force as a key
component of our larger military. However, the following discussion
examines some of the pertinent issues in the debate over the roles of the
regular active duty and National Guard forces.
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During the last year, as part of the debates concerning reductions in
the size of the services, one area of disagreement is the question of the
cost of regular forces as compared to the cost of the National Guard.
Various studies have produced differing conclusions; studies by the
Reserve Forces Policy Board, the RAND Corporation, and from within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense are some of the best known.
Advocates for reductions in the National Guard have argued that there
is no major cost saving to be had by either growing or retaining the
current size and structure of the Guard at the expense of the regulars.
Support for this position has consisted largely of data showing that when
federalized, Guard units and personnel cost the same as regular forces.
Additionally, adherents to this position argue that maintaining Guard
units at the high levels of readiness and modernization they have held
over the past twelve years have resulted in higher costs.
Undeniable, when federalized, Guard units cost roughly the same as
regular units. Similarly, it is also true regular forces maintain the large
institutional military training and professional education structure from
which all components of the services benefit. There is also no denying
that significant resources have been expended over the past twelve years
to meet the Defense Department’s statutory and moral obligations to
recapitalize the National Guard and bring its units and personnel up
to par with active forces in terms of fielding the same equipment and
maintaining the same standards of readiness in training, personnel, and
logistics. However, these arguments miss some major points.
First, since the modernization of the Army Guard has been virtually
completed over the past twelve years, the costs of providing updated and
modern equipment will not continue at the same levels in the future.
Clearly, the costs of modernization for the Air Guard are a somewhat
different matter, as the Air Force has not invested in modernization of
the Guard in the same way the Army has done. Maintaining a modern
and capable National Guard is a necessity for the nation; in the absence
of a draft these forces have been and will continue to be used in combat,
and must have the same capabilities as the Active Army and Air Force.
This moral imperative dictates that modernization requirements will not
go away, regardless of the relative balance between Regular and Guard
forces. That investment will go far given the other cost-effective aspects
of the Guard.
Second, in the case of the Army, given the current Force Generation
Model, Guard units are only planned to be federalized for one year out
of every five—assuming Guard units will actually be mobilized with
any consistency at all. Given that deployments for all service components have slowed since the end of our involvement in Iraq and we can
expect they will be further reduced after the end of combat operations
in Afghanistan next year, in the future Guard units will rarely be federalized, except for routine deployments in support of operations in places
like Kosovo, or for training events. Additionally, as the reductions in
operational tempo and deployments affect the regulars in the same way
as the National Guard, it begs the question: In an era of severely constrained resources, when much of our military will be in a nondeployed
“dwell” status, why would we maintain large, expensive, and static
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regular forces at a reduced level of readiness, when we can maintain
those same forces with virtually identical capabilities and levels of readiness, at a fraction of the cost, in the National Guard?
Ultimately, the facts remain as they have for the entire military
history of this country. The National Guard, when not called into active
federal service, even when kept at a high state of readiness, does not cost
as much as regular forces. The majority of Guard personnel are paid
for a baseline of sixty-three days per year, and the federal government
does not maintain a large support structure of housing, schools, base
facilities, and support services for the Guard which are maintained for
the regulars. Retirement and medical costs for the Guard are a fraction
of the same costs for regulars. Training, equipment maintenance, operational mileage, and flying hour programs for the Guard are significantly
lower than those for the Active Force. The cost of maintaining National
Guard facilities is partly borne by the states. National Guard headquarters are smaller and do not require the same personnel overhead as their
active counterparts. Finally, the National Guard does not have to pay
to move its personnel and their families every two to three years. These
facts have remained unchanged for the past 237 years. The Army’s own
current cost data show that in one year, when not mobilized, Army
National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and other units cost
approximately one-third that of similar regular units.9 The fact that the
Army National Guard, which at current force levels is only one-third
smaller than the regular Army and provides thirty-nine percent of the
Army’s operating force, and yet only uses twelve percent of the Army’s
total budget, should make any further arguments about the relative costs
of each component irrelevant.10

Use

One of the arguments made by senior service leadership in support of
keeping a large active force is that the services do not have rapid or direct
access to the National Guard in a crisis or during routine circumstances
in the same way they have access to the regulars or reserves. The services
have complained that to gain access to the Guard for military operations
they must receive permission from states, governors, the Congress, and
follow other cumbersome procedures when trying to prepare and deploy
forces. They also have argued that even when they do gain access to the
Guard, it takes Guard units up to twenty-four months to prepare for
deployments, which is too long in a crisis situation. Consequently, they
argue they must have a large standing regular force ready to respond
instantaneously or overnight, and cannot be expected to work through
the complex and lengthy requirements needed to mobilize and deploy
the Guard.
To address these arguments, it is important to clarify the processes and authorities available to the services and to the President
and Congress when they need the country’s militia. Since 1792 when
Congress passed the Militia and Calling Forth Acts, the President and
Congress have had the statutory authority to federalize the militia, and
9     ARNG-G3 Briefing, “Many Feasible Alternatives Exist,” 24 July 2013 (US Army “FORCES”
costing model, 28 June 2013.
10     Ibid., slides 7-14.
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the laws now in place allow for rapid and complete federalization of
all the National Guard, parts of it, individual units, or even individual
soldiers and airmen. This federalization can be done without permission
from states, governors, Adjutants General, or anyone else. These are
the processes used since the beginning of the twentieth century, when
National Guard units were federalized to assist in the Mexican Punitive
Expedition; these same authorities were used to call into federal service
the entire National Guard at the stroke of a pen in both 1917 and 1940.
Three National Guard divisions were federalized during the Korean
War, and since 1991 the number of National Guard units, soldiers, and
airmen who have been mobilized into federal service for either training, overseas contingency operations, or direct combat has numbered in
the hundreds of thousands. In each of these cases, mobilizations have
been rapid, have followed the procedures set in law—and have not been
restricted by state authorities. Not once in the past twenty-five years
have the services been delayed or denied complete access to the combat
reserves of the National Guard when needed.
The argument that it takes up to twenty-four months to mobilize a
National Guard unit is also specious. There is no legal requirement for
any advance notice for the mobilization of the National Guard. In fact,
between 2001 and 2006, many National Guard units had as little as
thirty days notice for their deployments. The “requirement” for twentyfour months notification is a policy put in place by Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates to allow for more predictability for the Guard during
repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In actuality, the Air
Force requires all its National Guard units to maintain themselves and
their individual airmen at a level of readiness capable of being mobilized
and deployed in 72 hours, and the Army’s own training model dictates
that National Guard BCTs, the largest and most complex units in the
militia, can be mobilized and sent to a combat theater in an average of
80 days.11
Given these facts, it is likely that when the services use arguments
about “access,” they really mean “control.” Indeed, the services do not
exercise routine, direct control over the National Guard when it is in a
Title 32 United States Code (USC) status. When not under federal, or
Title 10 USC status, the National Guard is under the authority of its
respective state or territorial governors. As a result, the services do not
exert direct control over the National Guard all the time, but they do,
in fact, exert a significant amount of indirect control through regulatory
and fiscal mechanisms. National Guard officer promotions are managed
by the state, but this management must be done in accordance with
federal law and the regulatory requirements of the services. Standards
of training, personnel readiness, maintenance, and operational performance are dictated and managed by the services. Air National Guard
wings and other units operate daily under the management oversight
and control of their respective Air Force Major Commands—many
perform important operational missions seven days a week, while not
formally mobilized, under the control of those commands.

11     Office of the Secretary of Defense Report to Congress, “Reserve and Active Components Units of
the Armed Forces,” (Washington, DC: Draft working document, 26 September 2012).
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It is possible, therefore, that this issue of control can be reduced
to these terms: first, the Adjutants General respond to their governors
and not the service chiefs; second, the militia can be used by the governors in a state active duty status without reference to the services or
anyone else in the federal government; third, the governors can appoint
senior officers in the National Guard using individual state laws and
procedures, and only then submit those officers to a federal recognition
process for approval by Congress; and finally, the services cannot, by
federal statute, make major force structure or organizational changes to
the National Guard without permission from Congress and the affected
state governors.
Convenient or not, this is our military system, and it has been constituted in this fashion since the earliest days of the Republic for very
specific reasons. The militia tradition of this country dates back to the
English reaction against oppressive standing armies resulting from the
aftermath of the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century, and
the requirement for a strong, state-controlled, citizen militia was viewed
by the founders as a critical hedge against an oppressive executive power
or overreach by the central government.12 Finally, having such a large
and important part of the Army and Air Force residing in local communities, under state control, provides the enormous benefit to the
nation of creating and fostering close bonds between the military and
its parent society—bonds which would not exist if the military was stationed only on federal bases, isolated from the broader American people.
The National Guard is the military in our communities, a role which
is particularly important in the majority of states and territories where
there are no large federal installations. General Creighton Abrams, when
Chief of Staff of the Army in the early 1970s, recognized this very useful
bond when he reinforced the military construct through the doctrine
which bears his name, and which ensures the country cannot go to war
without mobilizing its citizens and communities through activation of
the National Guard and Reserve.
There is one final point about the use of the National Guard which
should be a part of the national discussion concerning the balance
between Active and Reserve Component forces. Our military currently
has only a limited amount of strategic deployment capacity, both air and
sea. This lift capability is a critical element in decisions about managing everything our military does in support of the national strategy,
from how it is organized, to the size and basing of units. Our strategic
lift capacity restricts the numbers of Army BCTs and other supporting
forces we can send around the world in a crisis. The time it takes to get
the first, limited number of units in place overseas, and then to get the
ships and planes back and set to move follow-on forces is and should be
a centrally important factor in how we manage the balance between the
number of regular combat units and the number of combat units in the
National Guard.

12     James Madison asserted in Federalist 46 that, given that the population of a country could
only support a Regular Army of a certain size, at the time of his writing the United States could
only expect to have a maximum standing force of 25-30,000. He then stated that the various states’
militias should be “half a million” strong to counter any potential threat to liberty from this standing force.
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For example, as stated previously, the Army’s training model directs
that it takes an average of 80 days to mobilize and prepare a National
Guard BCT for deployment. When during a crisis it takes 80 days or
longer for the first units to be deployed and for the ships and aircraft
to return for a second lift, it would perhaps make sense to plan for
a significant number of our second lift of combat forces to be from
the National Guard. Since the services can, in fact, rapidly call these
units and personnel into federal service immediately in time of emergency, we would merely need to mobilize them and begin final training
at the start of a crisis, so they would be ready for the second lift. Of
course, most situations which would require the deployment of large
numbers of conventional forces would not arise overnight, so in reality
the National Guard could actually be mobilized and start final training
well in advance of any projected or required deployment date. All units,
regardless of service component, not part of the first lift of forces are, in
fact, part of a second echelon; they are not a part of the first-line force
and standing by at a somewhat reduced level of readiness. Given this
fact, it is arguably more economically and militarily feasible in a time of
severely constrained resources, to choose the force which is the most
cost-effective to constitute the bulk of this second echelon. Doing so,
of course, would require that our national military leadership embrace
the fact that Guard forces are actually part of their larger service, and
are capable of performing at levels equal to their regular counterparts.

Effectiveness

A final argument in this debate, one which has been made perhaps
less stridently in the past few years but one which has existed for as long
as our country’s military, is that of the relative combat effectiveness
of the National Guard. The argument between Regular and Provincial
during the colonial period, between Continental and Militiaman during
the Revolutionary War, and between the Regulars and the Volunteers
and militia during the nineteenth century are all a part of this age-old
conundrum. The post-Civil War position taken by one of the fathers of
modern American military thought, Emory Upton, was that regulars
were the only really viable force on the modern battlefield and that
militia or volunteers were of limited value, at best.13 But his contemporaries Leonard Wood, Nelson Miles, and later, John Pershing, were very
complimentary of these soldiers and used them to great effect in their
campaigns in the American West and especially in Cuba, the Philippines,
and WWI.
The very small size of the peacetime regular Army during the first
half of the twentieth century was probably responsible for this debate
subsiding—the massive national mobilization efforts during the world
wars demanded a far less parochial view of the various service components’ relative levels of efficacy. The argument has returned since then,
and seems to be a regular manifestation of our peacetime jockeying for
reduced military resources. The most recent incarnation of this perennial debate has taken a few distinct tacks. First, full Air National Guard
unit mobilizations have not occurred at any significant level during this
wartime period—the Air Guard has met its deployment responsibilities
13     Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
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by using individual volunteers or small parts of units, because the larger
units themselves are not ready or able to take on a full mobilization.
Second, although the Army Guard has undoubtedly mobilized and
deployed enormous numbers of units and soldiers, its divisions and
BCTs have not performed as true “battle-space owners” in the conduct
of full-spectrum combat operations—they lack the higher-order skills
and experience to do so effectively.
These arguments obscure some important truths. Air National
Guard units have mobilized and deployed exactly those capabilities,
sometimes embodied as full units and sometimes as unit or individual
contributions to the Air Expeditionary Forces, which the Air Force has
directed them to provide. Air Force senior leaders, to their credit, have
openly acknowledged that without the routine and critical contributions
of the Air National Guard, the Air Force would not have had the successes they have enjoyed over the past twelve years. Indeed, the Air
Force could not have performed its mission at all. Air National Guard
units provide virtually all of the Combat Air Patrols over the continental
United States, and without the refueling missions performed daily by
the Air National Guard, such as the Atlantic air bridge provided by the
Guard’s Northeast Tanker Task Force, these operations would flatly not
have been possible. It is important to note that mobilization and deployment policies and procedures are set by the Defense Department and the
services, not by the National Guard or the states; these policies, which
have been in place during the past several years, do not necessarily reflect
the laws which govern Guard mobilizations or combat employment.
Army senior leaders have stated that Guard combat brigades and
divisions have not performed the same difficult missions as their regular
counterparts, and have insinuated that although at the company and
even battalion level the Guard performs very well, the higher headquarters do not. Again—Guard units have performed exactly those missions
which they have been given by the Army, and do not have a say in what
those missions are. Additionally, over seventeen of the forty-six Guard
brigades deployed since 2001 have, in fact, performed full-spectrum
operations in theater.14 Those that have not were acting as security
forces or in many cases as training teams embedded with either Iraqi or
Afghan forces—arguably the most critical mission ensuring the longterm success of both theater strategies. It is important to note that at the
height of National Guard combat deployments to Iraq in 2005, when
over forty percent of the combat units were from the National Guard,
the Guard also rapidly mobilized and deployed over 50,000 soldiers
and airmen in domestic support of Hurricane Katrina relief operations,
including two division headquarters to exercise command and control.
National Guard BCTs and divisions routinely manage the Guard’s
complex Constitutional role of domestic support during emergencies,
a military mission at least equal in importance to overseas operations.
Ultimately, however, these arguments are unnecessary and unhelpful. At the outset of any conflict, regular units generally can be expected
to have a more rapid transition to a wartime footing, and can in most
cases conduct complex operations more readily. After a transitional
14     ARNG-G3 Briefing, 28 June 2013, "ARNG BCTs Deployed by Year," (source DAMPS
orders).
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period, the militia gain the skills needed and perform equally as well
as regulars. This paradigm has been the case in every single war this
country has waged, and the past thirteen years have been no different,
except perhaps in the fact that the transitional period was far shorter
and in some cases nonexistent, due to the great investments made by
the services in training and leader development for the National Guard
following the First Gulf War. National Guard units, both Army and
Air, have performed just as well in the past thirteen years as any of
their regular counterparts—there is no evidence suggesting they have
had leadership or disciplinary problems, or combat failures out of the
norm. The truth is that regardless of service component, there are good
units and good leaders, and there are ineffective units and marginal
leaders. Some of them are regulars, and some are in the National Guard.
Again—there were virtually no regular units at many of the most important military engagements in our history, and the oldest and some of the
most highly decorated units in the military are in the National Guard.
A final word on this argument: How many National Guard units must
fight and succeed, suffer casualties, earn decorations and citations, and
serve with dedication and honor before we stop this destructive debate
and make no distinction between organizations, regardless of component? A soldier or airman, an Army Brigade Combat Team or Air Force
Wing is and ought to be an interchangeable combat capability, regardless
of component. Acceptance of this fact is the only way to solve the larger
problems we face as a military.

Conclusion

In 2000, before the start of the current series of wars and interventions, the Army National Guard had, along with myriad other units,
forty-two combat brigades within its force structure. The regular Army
contained thirty-three combat brigades. This ratio was widely perceived
as normal and acceptable by senior leaders and force planners—after
all, throughout the country’s history the peacetime balance between the
militia and the Regulars has always been that way—a highly trained,
professional, and ready regular force, supported by its combat reserve
of a larger, well-resourced, and ready militia. This balance served us
well in the initial years of conflict after 2001. As planned and executed
time and again in the past 237 years, the National Guard mobilized
units and provided follow-on forces after the regulars conducted initial
operations. In the breathing and reset space allowed by the mobilization
of the National Guard, the United States had time to grow the size of
the regulars while maintaining steady deployments.
A difference, however, between these past twelve years and our
other periods of conflict, occurred regarding the balance of militia and
regular combat forces. Throughout this period of conflict, the number
of combat brigades in each service component was radically altered.
Between 2001 and 2013, the regular Army has grown to include fortyfive combat brigades, while the National Guard has been reduced from
forty-two to twenty-eight combat brigades—a thirty-three percent decline
during wartime. Why is this? Many of the Guard combat brigades have
been converted to either support or multifunctional units, while a few
have been eliminated. This change has altered the important balance
in our forces which has always allowed for our country to mobilize its
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combat capacity rapidly without spending enormous sums in peacetime
to maintain a standing force. Additionally, the regular Army is now out
of balance and no longer has the ability to support itself with units which
provide engineering, logistics, and other support functions for combat
formations—these types of units overwhelmingly now reside in the
Guard or the Army Reserve. The Combat Reserve of the Army, which
has historically always been the National Guard, is now for the first time
in our history in danger of not being able to mirror or provide the same
maneuver combat functions as the active Army.
This article posed two questions: What is different about 2014
and this particular period of post-conflict national retrenchment that
would cause our service leaders to try to change historically proven and
accepted norms and practices? Why is there a need, given the current
National Military Strategy and significant resource constraints, when
our conventional forces are not likely to be widely engaged or deployed
in the near future, to retain large forces in the active military and reduce
the vastly less-expensive National Guard? I would suggest there is, in
fact, no difference between now and any other period of post-conflict
retrenchment in our national history. There is no valid reason to abandon
our time-tested and broadly accepted methods of military organization
in peacetime.
There may be some who argue that the world is a much more
unstable and dangerous place now than ever before, and that the United
States has far too many commitments to allow for a significant reduction
in active forces, and so the needed cuts in forces must be found elsewhere. There are also those who argue that whatever cuts are made must
be “fairly apportioned” between the various components of the Army
and Air Force. These arguments do not support close examination. The
world is not more dangerous or unstable now than in the past—there
are fewer wars and other conflicts now across the globe than at any time
in the past thirty years. The United States faces no existential threats,
and there are no peer military powers on earth immediately pressing our
allies or other interests. There is, still, a valid need for us to have a military that can respond to crises and maintain the ability to deploy rapidly
in emergencies, while being able to fight and win against any adversary.
But there are no truly looming threats and adversaries who are any more
dangerous than those we have faced in the past, and who should cause us
to reverse hundreds of years of proven military organizational practices.
If our global commitments are such that some argue we must maintain a large standing regular force, an historical comparison may be useful
as a rebuttal. At the height of the British Empire, in the years around the
turn of the twentieth century when the global political, diplomatic, and
military situation was fraught with crises and tensions which ultimately
built to the start of the First World War, the British government was
able to maintain its dominion and exercise its military commitments to
the Empire—one quarter of the earth’s surface including one quarter
of the earth’s population—with a regular Army that never exceeded
300,000 men.15 Does the United States now have commitments and a
global dominion that would cause us to exceed this number? Or can we
15     In August, 1914, at the start of the First World War, the regular British Army had a strength
of 247, 342. See Tim Travers, “The Army and the Challenge of War,” in The Oxford History of the
British Army, ed. David Chandler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211.
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afford to transfer some of our active military capacity into our proven
National Guard, where it can remain trained and ready and cost the
nation approximately one-third what it would cost to maintain it on
active duty?
What is the reason for the emphasis on “proportionality” in proposed military reductions? Any adherent to this position must explain
a few things. If all units, soldiers, and airmen are truly viewed as equal,
interchangeable, and important elements of their respective services,
why would not the Army and the Air Force work to save vast amounts
of money, and preserve a broader and higher level of unit readiness, by
retaining a greater number of combat brigades and Air Wings through
transferring them, by apportion, from the Active Army and Air Force
to the National Guard? “Fairness” and “proportionality” have nothing
whatever to do with it—the real issue is for us together to rationally
determine how we can maintain the best military with the largest capacity and capability at the least cost to the nation. In order to reach this
point, this point of decisionmaking, truly visionary leaders would have
to finally and completely abandon the parochial views which pit regular
against militiaman, and which view one component as somehow inherently superior to another, without recognizing the unique values and
strengths of each which combine to provide the nation with its best
possible military.
Clearly these questions require serious and open debate, in circles
both inside and outside the military hierarchy and the government. The
successful future of our all-volunteer military and our country’s financial health demand that it occur soon.

